From Kristen Luker, When Sex Goes to School: Warring Views on Sex-- and Sex Education-- Since the Sixties (18):
Many reproductive politics activists on all sides, I believe, generally agree with Luker's assertion, although they might not articulate it as such. I think that most people active in this area of political life agree that beliefs about one facet of sex, relationships, families, etc. are not held in isolation but tend to be part of a constellation of beliefs, interconnected and (they hope or assume) internally coherent-- a kind of ideology of sex and reproduction.
Where they might disagree with Luker, a sociologist, is the degree of independent choice they exercise over the adoption and development of their constellation of views-- whether they choose to believe a set of views or are socialized to believe them, given their experiences and social context (or some combination of choice and socialization).
Sociologists and other social scientists often conclude something like the following: "You believe X not just because X is inherently correct in your view, but also because it is motivated by Y and the situation Z you find yourself in." They also sometimes conclude something like this: "In your words and in the top layer of your thinking you say you believe 1A and for set of reasons X, but in reality you believe something a little different, 1B, and in reality you believe it for a rather different set of reasons."
Naturally, people do not like to be told that they don't mean what they say and they don't say what they mean! Given that many academic researchers come to conclusions about social life that are seen as "liberal," conservative activists and pundits often accuse academics of arrogant presumption and bias-- "quit telling me that I dislike Barack Obama because of his race!" for example.
Activists-- and scholars, too-- might disagree also about the direction of the causal arrow in Luker's work: Does a person develop views about sex and reproduction first, and then these beliefs affect his or her understanding and interpretation of the larger world? Or, does a person's beliefs about the larger world come first and then shape her or his views about abortion, sex, family planning, and sexual orientation (Luker's general conclusion)? Or do they affect each other?
My educated guess is that, for most people, the causal arrow goes both ways, and the degree to which one affects the other (a person's larger worldview more dominant or a person's narrower set of beliefs about sex and reproduction more dominant) depends on a person's specific life experiences.
Therefore, while Luker's work is extremely valuable and insightful, it should be taken as demonstrating one facet of a more complicated social and psychological dynamic.
Links:
Kristin Luker home page at the University of California-Berkeley
In the nineteenth century, Sigmund Freud famously thought that life was sex in disguise. A joke, a pun, a slip of the tongue, a symptom, were all silent expressions of forbidden wishes in nineteenth-centure Vienna, and the forbidden was very often the sexual. By looking at sex and sex education today, I want to argue the other side of that equation: that sex is life in disguise. When Americans talk about sex, we are simultaneously and covertly talking about all the things going on in our world outside of the bedroom. Gender, power, conflict, cooperation, religion, culture, the future, and even (bear with me) the global economy are there . . .This is a fundamental insight about reproductive politics. Luker is well equipped to identify and communicate it, as she made the same point regarding abortion in her 1984 book Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood.
Many reproductive politics activists on all sides, I believe, generally agree with Luker's assertion, although they might not articulate it as such. I think that most people active in this area of political life agree that beliefs about one facet of sex, relationships, families, etc. are not held in isolation but tend to be part of a constellation of beliefs, interconnected and (they hope or assume) internally coherent-- a kind of ideology of sex and reproduction.
Where they might disagree with Luker, a sociologist, is the degree of independent choice they exercise over the adoption and development of their constellation of views-- whether they choose to believe a set of views or are socialized to believe them, given their experiences and social context (or some combination of choice and socialization).
Sociologists and other social scientists often conclude something like the following: "You believe X not just because X is inherently correct in your view, but also because it is motivated by Y and the situation Z you find yourself in." They also sometimes conclude something like this: "In your words and in the top layer of your thinking you say you believe 1A and for set of reasons X, but in reality you believe something a little different, 1B, and in reality you believe it for a rather different set of reasons."
Naturally, people do not like to be told that they don't mean what they say and they don't say what they mean! Given that many academic researchers come to conclusions about social life that are seen as "liberal," conservative activists and pundits often accuse academics of arrogant presumption and bias-- "quit telling me that I dislike Barack Obama because of his race!" for example.
Activists-- and scholars, too-- might disagree also about the direction of the causal arrow in Luker's work: Does a person develop views about sex and reproduction first, and then these beliefs affect his or her understanding and interpretation of the larger world? Or, does a person's beliefs about the larger world come first and then shape her or his views about abortion, sex, family planning, and sexual orientation (Luker's general conclusion)? Or do they affect each other?
My educated guess is that, for most people, the causal arrow goes both ways, and the degree to which one affects the other (a person's larger worldview more dominant or a person's narrower set of beliefs about sex and reproduction more dominant) depends on a person's specific life experiences.
Therefore, while Luker's work is extremely valuable and insightful, it should be taken as demonstrating one facet of a more complicated social and psychological dynamic.
Links:
Kristin Luker home page at the University of California-Berkeley
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